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ABSTRACT 
The apparent failure of individual probabilistic expressions to distinguish between 
uncertainty and ignorance, and between certainty and confidence, have swayed 
researchers to seek alternative formalisms, where confidence measures are provided 
explicit notation. This paper summarizes how a causal networks formulation of 
probabilities facilitates the representation of confidence measures as an integral part 
of a knowledge system that does not require the use of higher order probabilities. 
We also examine whether Dempster-Shafer intervals represent confidence about 
probabilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
People make a distinction between sure and unsure probabilistic judgments. 
For example, everyone would agree that a typical coin has a 50% chance of 
turning up heads, while most people would hesitate to assign a definite 
probability to a coin produced in a gambler's basement. For that reason we 
sometimes feel more comfortable assigning a range rather than a point estimate 
of uncertainty, thus expressing our ignorance, doubt, or lack of confidence in the 
judgment required. We may say, for example, that the probability of the coin 
turning up heads lies somewhere between 60 % and 40 %, having no idea whether 
or how the coin was biased. 
The apparent failure of individual probabilistic expressions to distinguish 
between uncertainty and ignorance, certainty and confidence, have swayed 
researchers to seek alternative formalisms, where confidence measures are 
provided explicit notation (Shafer [1]). In a recent paper (Pearl [2]), I have 
attempted to demonstrate how the causal networks formulation of probabilities 
facilitates the representation f confidence measures as an integral part of one's 
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knowledge system, requiring no specialized notation or the use of higher-order 
probabilities (Kyburg, this volume). 
In this note I will summarize my earlier argument (Pearl [2]) and then 
examine whether probability intervals in the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) formalism 
represent two components of confidence measures: insecurity due to uncertain 
contengencies and ignorance for lack of a complete model. My conclusion is that 
they do not. Although the presence of a nonzero D-S interval is sufficient o 
indicate some incompleteness in the probability model, the narrowing of the 
interval or even its disappearance does not indicate removal of ignorance or 
increased confidence in the model. 
ON INSECURITY DUE TO UNCERTAIN CONTINGENCIES 
The starting point is a claim that probabilistic statements such as P(A)  = p 
are in themselves empirical events of no less stature than other sentences 
reporting empirical observations. While not referring to an event open to full 
public scrutiny, these statements do, nevertheless, report outcomes of genuine 
experiments, namely, the mental procedures involved in assessing the belief of a 
given proposition A. Thus, stating "event A has a chance p of occurring" is 
equivalent to stating "the mental event of computing the likelihood of A has 
produced the outcome p . "  
Having endowed probabilistic statements with event status neutralizes the 
syntactic objection against writing sentences such as P[P(A)  = p]. Both the 
square brackets and parentheses nclose arguments of the same type--empirical 
events. True, the latter event is external, while the former is personal. However, 
this distinction is not a barrier to useful semantics; the adoption of a 
computational model of knowledge representation (e.g., semantic networks, 
causal models) permits us to specify the mental procedures involved in belief 
assessments with the same clarity and precision with which we specify 
experimental procedures in a laboratory setting. What remains to be done is, 
first, to explain what renders the event P(A)  = p an unknown, random event, 
rather than a fixed outcome of a stable procedure and, second, to explicate more 
precisely the mental procedures involved in making the two assessments, P(A)  
and P IP (A)  = p]. 
A paradigm answering the first question has been suggested by de Finetti [3] 
and has been guiding the Bayesian interpretation of confidence measures for 
over a decade (Spiegelhalter [4], Heckerman and Jimison [5]). The basic idea is 
that the event P(A)  = p is perceived to be a random variable whenever the 
assessment of P(A)  depends ubstantially on the occurrence or nonoccurrence 
of some other events modeled by the system called contingencies. In the words 
of de Finetti: 
The information apt to modify the probability assessed for an event E-- 
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in so far as the observation of Hi makes us change from P(E) to 
P(E[Hi)--can make us view the Hi's as sort of "noisy" signals 
concerning the occurrence and non-occurrence of the event E. 
Adopting this interpretation, one can show that the procedure involved in the 
assessment ofP[P(A) = p] is no different from that involved in the assessment 
of P(A) and, moreover, that the very information used for calculating P(A) is 
sufficient for calculating the confidence interval associated with the statement 
P(A) = p. This is based on the observation that by specifying a causal model 
for predicting the outcome A, we automatically specify the variance of that 
prediction. Formally, if C is a set of contingencies affecting A, then knowing 
P(A I c) and P(c) permits us to simulate the behavior of P(A I c) as C takes on 
various realizations c with their associated probabilities P(c). The histogram of 
P(A I c) then defines the variance of P(A). 
In other words, when a person encodes probabilistic knowledge as a causal 
model of interacting variables, that person automatically specifies, not merely 
the marginal and joint distributions of the variables in the system, but also a set 
of future scenarios, describing how these probabilities would vary in response to 
future eventualities. It is this implicitly encoded dynamics that renders 
probabilistic statements random events, admitting distributions, intervals and 
other confidence measures. Thus, the notions of insecurity and doubt are 
intrinsic and indigenous to classical probabilistic formulation; no second-order 
probabilities or specialized notational machinery are required to reinstate them 
where they flourish so naturally. 
ON THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER INTERVALS 
I have argued (Pearl [2]) that the Dempster-Shafer (D-C) interval does not 
represent the degree of insecurity people feel toward the assessment of point 
probability values. My argument was that people's insecurity is often associated 
with a high degree of sensitivity to unknown contingencies, and that such 
sensitivity is describable in traditional models of probability theory and, since 
the D-S interval vanishes whenever we are in possession of a complete 
probabilistic model, it could not possibly reflect this component of people's 
insecurity. 
Reiterating the example given in my earlier paper (Pearl, [2]), suppose we 
know that a given coin was produced by a defective machine--that precisely 
49 % of its output consists of double-headed coins, 49 % are double-tailed coins, 
and the rest are fair. This description constitutes a complete probabilistic model 
that predicts that the outcome of the next toss will be heads with probability 50 % 
and alerts us to the fact that the prediction is extremely susceptible to new 
information regarding the nature of the coin. Most people will hesitate to commit 
a point estimate of 50% to the next outcome of the coin, as is attested by the 
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natural tendency to lower one's bet, on heads or tails alike, compared with bets 
wagered on a fair coin. Most people would rather wait for some clue or toy with 
introspective analysis reflecting on the coin type. The D-S theory nevertheless 
assigns the next outcome abelief of 50 %, with zero belief interval. Now imagine 
that we toss the coin twice and observe a tail and a head. This immediately 
implies that the coin is fair, and hence most people would regain confidence to 
assign the next toss a 50 % chance of turning up heads. Yet such narrowing of the 
confidence interval would remain unnoticed in the D-S formalism; the theory 
will again assign the next outcome a belief of 50 % with zero belief interval. 
Next we examine the notion of ignorance due to model incompleteness. The 
D-S interval is often interpreted to portray the degree of ignorance we have 
about probabilities--namely, the degree to which the information we lack 
prevents us from constructing a complete probabilistic model of the domain. If  
this were so, then the D-S approach would indeed have a definite advantage over 
Bayesian methods, which always provide point probabilities. Unlike the latter, 
which often give one a false sense of security in the model, the D-S interval 
would have served as a warning device, distinguishing beliefs based on well- 
founded probabilities from those based on partially specified models. 
Unfortunately, the D-S intervals have little to do with ignorance, nor do they 
represent bounds on the probabilities that would ensue once ignorance is 
removed. This can be demonstrated using the classical three-prisoners puzzle. 
The story involves three prisoners A, B, and C awaiting their verdict, 
knowing that one of them will be found guilty and the other two released. 
Prisoner A asks the jailer, who knows the verdict, to pass a letter to some other 
prisoner who is to be released. Later, prisoner A asks the jailer for the name of 
the letter recipient and, having learned that the jailer gave the letter to prisoner 
B, the problem is to assess the belief that A is the one found guilty. 
The problem can be formulated in terms of three mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive propositions GA, GB, and Gc, where Gi stands for "prisoner i was 
found guilty." Coupled with these, we also have the jailer's testimony, which 
could have been either "B"  or "C"  and so can be treated as a bivalued variable 
L (connoting "letter recipient") taking on the values {LB, Lc }. 
In the Bayesian treatment of the problem, one assumes equal prior 
probabilities on the component of G, r(GA) = r(GB) = r(Gc)  = 1/3, and 
P(LB[GA) = 1/2; namely, if A were guilty, the jailer would choose the letter 
recipient at random, giving an equal chance to B and C. These two assumptions 
yield the answer P(GAILB) = 1/3, meaning that the jailer's testimony is totally 
irrelevant relative to A's prospects of being released. If, on the other hand, the 
letter is not handed at random but the jailer prefers B (or C), then the posterior 
The following analysis contains excerpts from my forthcoming book Probabilistic Reasoning in
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probability P(GAILa) would vary from zero (if B is avoided) to 1/2 (if C is 
avoided). 
In the D-S treatment of the problem we do not assume values for the prior or 
conditional probabilities unless we have evidence to substantiate hese values. 
For example, if we have good reason to believe that the testimonies in the trial 
are equally supportive of either prisoner's innocence, then, and only then, we 
would take the liberty of assigning equal weights to the components of G, 
m(Gg) = m(GB) = m(Gc) = I/3. Assuming this is the case in our story, still, 
having no idea of the process by which the letter ecipient was selected prevents 
us from completing the model and yields Bel (GA) = Bel (-~ GA) = 1/2; 
reflecting a zero interval yet an answer different from that of Bayesian analysis. 
This disparity is not surprising in view of the fact that we have an incomplete 
probabilistic model on our hands, as the process by which B was selected 
remains unspecified. Conservatively speaking, it is quite possible that the jailer's 
choice was not random but marred by a deliberate attempt to avoid choosing C 
whenever possible. Under such extreme circumstances, the jailer's answer La 
could only be avoided one-third of the time (when B is guilty), thus leaving A 
and C an equal chance of being the condemned. What may sound somewhat 
counterintuitive is that, from among all possible ways of completing the model, 
D-S theory appears to select this extreme and unlikely model, which also 
happens to be the one that puzzle books repeatedly warn us to avoid. 
Actually the D-S theory never attempts to complete the model, and, although 
the jailer's testimony causes all the weight to be committed to singleton 
hypotheses, m(Gg) = m(Gc) = 1/2, the model remains only partially specified, 
as we still are .in ignorance regarding the letter delivery process. Knowing the 
selection process is important because, in Bayesian analysis, it could sway the 
posterior probability P(GA I LB) all the way from zero to 1/2. Yet the interval 
P I (GA)  - Bel (GA) is zero, giving one the false impression that the answer Bel 
(GA) = 1/2 is based on a complete model (with the jailer attempting to avoid C 
whenever possible). 
The disparity between the answers produced by the two formalisms tems not 
from the weight distribution but rather from the semantics of these answers. 
While the probabilistic approach interprets "belief in A"  to mean the 
conditional probability that A is true given the evidence , the D-S approach 
calculates the probability that proposition A becomes provable given the 
evidence . Phrased another way, it computes the probability that some set of 
hypotheses suggested by the evidence would materialize (e.g., that the judges 
become convinced by an alibi), from which the truth of A can be derived out of 
logical necessity. Thus, instead of the conditional probability P(A l e), the D-S 
theory computes the probability of the logical entailment e ~ A. The two could 
be made as far apart as one wishes, depending on the choice of compatibility 
relationships by which proofs are constructed. 
Thus, the disappearance of the D-S interval Pl(A) - Bel (A) does not mean 
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the removal of ignorance. It simply means that, based on the logical abstraction 
chosen to represent compatibility relationships, the available vidence could not 
simultaneously becompatible with A and its negation -~ A. It is curious to note 
that applying the same interpretation to Bayesian models yields an interval that 
never vanishes, because, barring extreme probabilities, a body of (noisy) 
evidence is always combatible with both a proposition and its negation. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, D-S intervals might have a place in the analysis of evidence, 
but they do not possess all the qualities that the literature often wishes them to 
have. In particular, they do not represent insecurity about probability assess- 
ments or ignorance about missing information. The former can be obtained from 
the traditional representation f Bayesian networks, while the latter can be 
obtained from the bounds produced by Nilsson's probabilistic logic (Nilsson 
[6]). 
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